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Abstract 
A simple integrated assessment framework that gives rules for the optimal carbon price, transition 
to the carbon-free era and stranded carbon assets is presented, which highlights the ethical, 
economic, geophysical and political drivers of optimal climate policy. For the ethics we discuss 
the role of intergenerational inequality aversion and the discount rate, where we show the 
importance of lower discount rates for appraisal of longer run benefit and of policy makers using 
lower discount rates than private agents. The economics depends on the costs and rates of 
technical progress in production of fossil fuel, its substitute renewable energies and sequestration. 
The geophysics depends on the permanent and transient components of atmospheric carbon and 
the relatively fast temperature response, and we allow for positive feedbacks. The politics stems 
from international free-rider problems in absence of a global climate deal. We show how results 
change if different assumptions are made about each of the drivers of climate policy. Our main 
objective is to offer an easy back-on-the-envelope analysis, which can be used for teaching and 
communication with policy makers. 
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1. Introduction 
Our aim is to present a back-on-the-envelope integrated assessment framework that can be used 
to derive optimal climate policies in a transparent and intuitive way. Climate policy has to deal 
with several intertemporal, geophysical, and interregional aspects. 
To discuss these issues, we use a framework consisting of an economic part (to describe the use 
of fossil fuel use and its substitute renewable energy, carbon sequestration with trend growth and 
sector-specific rates of technical progress, global damages to economic production) and a climate 
part (to describe the dynamics of atmospheric carbon and global mean temperature). This 
framework allows us to derive welfare-maximising climate policies as simples rules for the 
optimal carbon price (equal to the social cost of carbon), the rate at which renewable energies are 
substituted for fossil fuel, the fraction of fossil that is abated by carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS), the optimal timing of the transition to the carbon-free era, the maximum cumulative 
emissions (or the carbon budget for short) and the maximum warming level, and the amount of 
fossil fuel locked up forever in the crust of the earth. The geophysical, ethical and economic 
drivers of climate policy can thus clearly be identified. 
We highlight various features. Regarding the ethics of climate policy, we allow discount rates to 
decline with the horizon at which costs and benefits are evaluated. Since the costs of global 
warming occur many decades or even centuries into the future, this has important implications 
for policy. This feature is known as hyperbolic discounting and has been put forward by 
Laibson (1997). Following von Below (2012), Schmitt (2014), Belfiori (2017), and 
Barrage (2018) we also allow policy makers to have a lower ethical discount rate than the market. 
Both these features allow us to take a stance between the low discount rate used by Stern (2007) 
and the high discount rate used by Nordhaus (2008): policy makers use lower discount rates for 
long-run than for short-run appraisal of costs and benefits and may be more farsighted than the 
market. Both features generally lead to time inconsistency. Given simplifying assumptions, 
problems of commitment do not arise in our model.3 Regarding the geophysical drivers of climate 
policy, apart from our benchmark of simple linear carbon and temperature dynamics used by 
atmospheric physicists (e.g., Joos et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2016; Aengenheyster et al., 2018) and 
economists (e.g., Hassler and Krusell, 2012; Golosov et al., 2014; van den Bijgaart et al., 2016; 
Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; Gerlagh and Liski, 2018), we also allow for a model of carbon 
dynamics with the positive feedback loop that get unleashed as the capacity of the oceans to 
                                                            
3 We refer to the papers of Gerlagh and Liski (2018) and Iverson and Karp (2018) for time-consistent 
(technically subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium) solutions to the difficult problem of deriving welfare-
maximising climate policies under quasi-hyperbolic discounting in general equilibrium models with capital 
formation. 
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absorb carbon diminishes (Millar et al., 2016). Finally, regarding the political drivers of climate 
policy, we extend our simple rules to allow for non-cooperative decision making to illustrate the 
point of international free riding and the less ambitious climate policies that result from this 
(Barrett, 2003). This addresses the problem of free riding and is relevant as long as there are no 
international climate deals with appropriate international transfers to ensure that the global carbon 
price indeed gets implemented throughout the world economy. 
Our objective is not to present any novel theoretical results, but to present a simple framework 
that is consistent with a large and sometimes hard to comprehend integrated assessment literature. 
We have used our framework for undergraduate and graduate teaching and in discussions with 
policy makers and interested lay persons. We have found it useful to highlight the drivers on 
climate policy and to illustrate various assumptions regarding the ethics, economics, geophysics 
and politics underlying climate policy.4  
Our contribution ties in with the emerging literature on simple and robust rules for the optimal 
carbon price (e.g., Nordhaus, 1991; Golosov et al., 2014; Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; van den 
Bijgaart et al., 2016; Allen, 2016; Dietz and Venmans, 2018; van der Ploeg, 2018; van den Bremer 
and van der Ploeg, 2018). We also offer simple rules for the optimal transition time to the carbon-
free era and the amount of locked up fossil fuel. These simple rules take advantage of the much 
faster convergence of Ramsey economic growth dynamics than that of the carbon cycle, thus 
greatly simplifying the complexity of the underlying system. The resulting rules are easy to 
understand, calculate, explain, and communicate. Furthermore, being simple feedback rules, they 
appear robust to different model specifications as they perform well in a wide variety of integrated 
assessment models (Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; van den Bijgaart et al., 2016; Barrage, 2014). 
A multitude of very large and detailed Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) of the economy and 
the climate are able to generate numerical simulations of the optimal global price of carbon, the 
implied optimal substitution rates of renewable energies for fossil fuel, and the optimal 
sequestration rates. Although such IAMs give careful suggestions for climate policies, the key 
determinants of these are difficult to understand. Furthermore, it has been argued that in providing 
exact numbers they appear more precise than the underlying science would permit and 
misrepresent the deep uncertainties surrounding global warming damages and the social cost of 
carbon (e.g., Pindyck, 2013; Wagner and Weitzman, 2015; Stern, 2016). We therefore prefer a 
clear and transparent approach in which all the drivers of climate policy are immediately apparent. 
To our benefit, recent insights in atmospheric science suggest that global warming is well 
                                                            
4 An Excel sheet is available for those who wish to examine the effect of varying assumptions and 
parameters values on optimal climate policies. 
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explained by cumulative carbon emissions rather than the stock of carbon in the atmosphere (e.g., 
Allen et al., 2016), even though large-scale IAMs have sophisticated and high-dimensional 
models to describe the carbon cycle and temperature responses to emission impulses. 
Our back-on-the-envelope IAM is adapted from the most widely-used IAM, i.e., DICE (Dynamic 
integrated model of climate and the economy; Nordhaus, 2008; 2014). In this IAM economic 
activity requires energy in production which in turn is generated using a continuum of 
technologies and energy sources. The energy mix with the lowest unit costs use fossil energy use 
only and have the largest amount of carbon emission per unit of energy. As more renewable 
energies are substituted for fossil fuel, the cost per unit of energy becomes more expensive whilst 
the carbon emissions per unit of energy fall. This substitution is driven by a spectrum of carbon-
free technologies, ranging from energy-saving to renewable energy generation in combination 
with gas-fired power plants. The most expensive fuel mix is fully carbon-free and is referred to 
as the “backstop” technology. Given our current technological knowledge, one can think of this 
backstop as CCS which takes carbon directly out of the atmosphere when using fossil fuel and 
then stores it underground as the most carbon-persistent production processes (such as 
metallurgical ones or air travel) cannot be decarbonised at current capabilities. We thus make 
explicit the difference between substitution of less carbon-intensive fuel in the energy mix5 and 
carbon capture and sequestration. This distinction is important as both instruments differ in their 
long-term effects: renewable energy create a legacy of unused fossil fuel deposits which can 
become economically lucrative if future policy becomes less ambitious while CCS bear the risk 
of leakage (Belfiori and Iverson, 2018). 
Like DICE, our benchmark IAM computes cumulative carbon use and does not speak to the issue 
of stranded carbon assets directly. However, we include an extension where the cost of extracting 
fossil fuel rises as less reserves are left in situ, which allows the economic analysis of stranded 
carbon assets too. We also give extensions to allow for research and development in renewable 
energy production and for CCS becoming more expensive as available CO2 reservoirs are being 
used up.6  
                                                            
5 In contrast, one can examine breakthrough renewable energy which comes in as a perfect substitute for 
fossil fuel only once it has gained a cost advantage and signals the abrupt end of the carbon era (e.g., Rezai 
and van der Ploeg, 2016). Somewhat unrealistically, the only lever of climate policy was thus the end of 
the carbon era (not the emission ratio) and thus cumulative emissions and peak warming. However, partial 
carbon reduction where mitigation and abatement are used alongside each other is clearly more realistic, so 
this together with the optimal transition times for the various energy phases is what we will introduce in an 
easy-to-understand, back-of-the-envelope IAM.   
6 While early contributions focused the effect of climate policy on stranded natural assets, i.e., the amount 
of fossil fuel to be abandoned in situ (McGlade and Ekins, 2015; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2017), recent 
studies include effects of policy on stranded physical and financial assets and nation states (Manley et al., 
2017; Baldwin et al., 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018).  
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We thus present a back-of-the-envelope IAM and derive simple rules for the optimal carbon price 
and climate policies. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 derives our simple rule for the optimal 
price of carbon and the optimal rates of substituting renewable energies for fossil fuel and of CCS. 
Section 4 discusses the timing of energy transitions, carbon budgets, and peak warming for 
different policy regimes arising under the optimal climate policy. Section 5 presents the optimal 
climate policies for our benchmark calibration. Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 discuss the sensitivity of 
optimal climate policies to different assumptions regarding the ethical, economic, geophysical 
and political drivers of climate policies, respectively. In particular, we allow for hyperbolic 
discounting and positive feedbacks resulting from capacity for absorbing CO2 diminishing as the 
oceans heat up. Section 10 concludes. 
 
2. A back-of-the-envelope Integrated Assessment Model 
Most IAMs simultaneously model the economic dynamics of the productive capabilities and the 
evolution of the climate. Following earlier work on simple rules (e.g., Nordhaus, 1991; Golosov 
et al., 2014; Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; van den Bijgaart et al., 2016; Allen, 2016; Dietz and 
Venmans, 2018; van der Ploeg, 2018; van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2018), we suppose that 
the dynamics of economic growth converge much faster than that of the carbon cycle and 
temperature dynamics. Given this and the long horizons involved in assessing optimal climate 
policy, we abstract from capital formation and assume for purposes of calculating the social cost 
of carbon that the economy has converged to its balanced growth path where aggregate global 
output of goods and services before climate damages, denoted by Y, and aggregate global 
consumption, denoted by C, are both growing at the exogenous rate of economic growth, g.  
Following DICE, we suppose that production of tY  at time t requires energy in a fixed and 
declining proportion, so that global aggregate energy use is 0 ,
r t
te Y


 where 0  is the initial 
energy intensity and r  is the rate at which the energy intensity declines over time. Energy is 
composed of both carbon-based sources (fossil fuel) and carbon-free sources (e.g., solar or wind). 
We denote by tm  the endogenous share of carbon-free sources in the energy mix and by ta  the 
endogenous fraction of emissions that is captured and stored using CCS and other sequestration 
technologies at time t. We suppose that energy is measured in Giga tonnes of carbon (GtC) or its 
equivalent. Hence, residual carbon emissions entering the atmosphere from aggregate production 
at time t amount to 
0(1 )(1 ) .
r t
t t ta m e Y


   
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The cost of the energy mix rises with the share of carbon-free renewable energies .tm  We suppose 
that the cost of one unit of energy declines at the relative rate of technical progress in using 
renewable energy rather than fossil fuel, denoted by ,Rr  thus capturing the potential for future 
cost reductions as carbon-free technologies mature. We let this cost be 10 1
m Rr t
t m tm H m e H
   
with 01,  0m H    and 1 0.H  Similarly, we suppose that the cost of sequestrating one unit of 
emissions is 
1
1
a Ar t
a ta e A
   with 1a   and 1 0,A   where the relative rate of technical progress 
in sequestration is denoted by Ar  and captures the potential for future cost reductions as 
sequestration technologies mature. We let the cost of generating 1 GtC of fossil fuel be 
0( ) ,
Fr tG t G e
  where 0 0G   denotes the initial cost and  Fr  is the rate of technical progress in 
producing fossil fuel (e.g., due to the invention of horizontal drilling in fracking).7 Our 
formulation is general and allows us to disentangle the dynamics of energy use per fuel type and 
energy efficiency. 
We denote the price of carbon emissions by ,tP  so that the total costs of the energy mix per unit 
of output are 
1 1
0 1 1 0 0(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) .
m aR A F
r tr t r t r t
t t m t a t t t t t tZ m H m e H a e A m G e m P a m e
   
               
Minimising this cost we get the upward-sloping schedules for the proportion of the energy mix 
that consists of renewable energy (also known as the mitigation rate) tm  and the share of 
emissions that is sequestrated (also known as the abatement rate) :ta   
(1) 
0 1 0
1
1
(1 )
, 0 1,
m
aF A
R
r t r t
t t t
a
t tr t
G e a e A a P H
m m
H e



 

 
    
   
 
 
 
 
(2)  1/ , 0 1,
a
Ar t
t t ta e P A a

    
where  1/ ( 1) 0i i    for i = m, a denote price elasticities.
8 A higher carbon price tP  thus 
leads to both more substitution of renewable energy in the energy mix and to more sequestration 
of carbon emissions. More technical progress in renewable energies (higher Rr ) leads to a faster 
substitution of renewable energies for fossil fuel but does not affect sequestration. The rate of 
                                                            
7 Energy modelling is more reduced in DICE. With H0 = G0 = 0 our energy sector is equivalent to that of 
DICE. By including the unit cost component H0 and G0 we are able to capture cost innovations such as the 
shale gas revolution which alter the energy mix and shift climate policy. 
8 Nordhaus (2013) sets m = 2.8 in which case the carbon price elasticity of mitigation is m = 0.55. DICE 
models the cost of renewable energy in excess of fossil energy, assuming implicitly a fixed baseline (i.e. 
fossil) energy share of GDP. We account for the cost of energy generation explicitly. 
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sequestration is only affected by its own technology parameters and increases as its cost falls 
(higher Ar  and lower A1). Higher cost of fossil fuel and lower cost of renewable energies (higher 
0G  and lower 0H  and 1)H  boost the share of energy mix that consists of carbon-free energies. 
Equation (1) imply that ( , )t tm m t P  and ( , ),t ta a t P and thus we can express minimal unit cost 
as ( , ).t tZ Z t P  The share of carbon-free sources in the energy mix, the fraction of emissions that 
are sequestrated and the minimal unit energy cost thus depend on the carbon price and time (via 
the various rates of technical progress). In the absence of carbon pricing, no emissions are 
sequestered (at = 0) while renewable energies are still utilised to the point where their marginal 
cost equals that of fossil energy, reflecting current economic circumstances. In pushing up the 
cost of polluting energy sources, carbon pricing increases the share of renewables in energy 
generation and makes sequestration profitable. 
The optimal pricing of carbon depends on the severity and duration of climate damage caused by 
one unit of carbon. We assume that, once carbon is emitted into the atmosphere, it evolves 
according to a two-box carbon cycle. The stock of atmospheric carbon P Tt t tE E E   consists of a 
permanent part, which retains a share 00 1   of carbon emissions. A transient part of 
atmospheric carbon, which retains a share 01   of carbon emissions, decays at the rate 1 0.   
We suppose that there is an average lag Tlag before global mean temperature responds to an 
increase in the stock of atmospheric carbon. We capture this by letting the aggregate flow damage 
from global warming per unit of output be given by ,td E  where tE denotes the delayed carbon 
stock (i.e., after temperature has responded to changes in the atmospheric carbon). We can thus 
summarise our model of the dynamics of atmospheric carbon and temperature by 
(3)  
  
  
0 0
0 0 1
1 ( , ) 1 ( , ) ,
(1 ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( , ) ,
( ) / .
r tP
t t t t
r tT T
t t t t t
P T
t t t t
E a t P m t P e Y
E a t P m t P e Y E
E E E E Tlag


 
  


  
    
  
 
Aggregate global consumption tC  is what is left of aggregate global production after subtracting 
global warming damages and energy costs. If the revenue from carbon taxes (or from selling 
carbon emission permits) are rebated to the private sector, it is 
(4)    01 ( , ) ( , ) /    as   ( , ) / (1 (1 ) .
r t
t t t t t t t t t t t tC d E Z t P P Z t P P Y Z t P P a m e Y


              
Climate policy maximises global welfare corresponding to the present discount value of utilities 
derived from the stream of present and future consumption levels, 
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(5) 
1
0
( )    with   ( ) ,
1
IIA
RTI t t
t t
C
U C e dt U C
IIA

   

 
subject to the dynamics of the climate system (3), where RTI > 0 denotes the constant rate of time 
impatience and the utility function is iso-elastic with a constant coefficient of relative 
intergenerational inequality aversion, IIA. The IIA captures how little current generations are 
prepared to sacrifice current consumption to limit future global warming.9 Upon substitution of 
aggregate consumption from (3) and 0
gt
tY Y e
  for trend aggregate world production, we get 
(5) 
0
0
1 ( , )
   with    ,
1
IIA
t t Rt
d E Z t P Y
e dt R RTI IIA g
IIA


          
 
 
  
where R denotes the (long-run) social discount rate (and corresponds to the one from the Keynes-
Ramsey rule). The social discount rate is high if the rate of time impatience is high, future 
generations are richer than current ones (provided IIA > 1), and intergenerational inequality 
aversion is high (provided 0g  ). The choice of the social discount rate has been subject to much 
debate. We have here a constant social discount rate, but will generalise our findings to non-
constant discount rates in section 6 where we combine relatively high short run discount rates 
suggested by Nordhaus (2008) with near-zero rates for the RTI as argued in the Stern Review. 
Output grows at constant trend rate of growth g. What matters for optimal (climate) policy is the 
social discount rate corrected for growth denoted by  
(6) ( 1) .SDR R g RTI IIA g        
This growth-corrected discount rate takes into account the trade-off between greater material 
wealth when deciding how much climate mitigation to do. If intergenerational inequality aversion 
is high (IIA > 1), higher income growth pushes up the SDR and future damages are taken into 
account (relatively) less. With logarithmic utility (IIA = 1), the SDR is simply the RTI. When 
intergenerational inequality aversion is low (IIA < 1), current generations are willing to sacrifice 
their own consumption even as future generations get richer. 
 
3. Optimal policies for making the energy mix carbon-free 
We can now conduct the cost-benefit analysis of choosing between fossil and renewable energy 
sources and the amount of emissions to be sequestered, having defined preferences, endowments, 
                                                            
9 For the iso-elastic utility function, it equals both the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse 
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
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and technology. The following result presents our simple rules for the optimal carbon price, ,tP  
the optimal share of carbon-free sources in the energy mix, tm  (the mitigation rate), and the 
fraction of emissions that are sequestrated, ta  (the abatement rate) for our back-on-the-envelope 
IAM. 
Result 1: The optimal carbon price is 
(7)        0 0
0
1
1 1
 with ,
1
gt
tP Y e d
SDR SDR SDR Tlag
 
 

  
    
    
   
where the growth-corrected social discount rate SDR is (6). Given (7), the fraction of fossil fuel 
use that is abated and the share of renewable energies in total energy follow from (1) and (2). 
Proof: see Appendix 1. 
Expression (1) for our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon does not depend on the fossil 
fuel intensity of the economy, because along the balanced growth path the consumption share is 
fixed. The optimal carbon price is proportional to GDP and hence grows at rate g. The optimal 
carbon price is depressed by the lag between changes in temperature and in the stock of 
atmospheric carbon (Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; van den Bijgaart et al., 2016). If the 
temperature lag is absent, (7) boils down to the simple rule derived in Golosov et al. (2014).10 The 
carbon price also depends on other geophysical factors. It increases in the share of emissions that 
stay permanently in the atmosphere (higher 0 )  and increases if the rate of decay of atmospheric 
carbon drops (lower 1 ). The latter might occur if global warming has depressed the absorption 
capacity of the oceans and other carbon sinks. The ethical drivers of the carbon price can be seen 
from the SDR. If society is relatively impatient (high RTI) and shows little willingness to sacrifice 
current consumption to curb future global warming (high IIA), the SDR is high and thus carbon 
pricing is unambitious. Finally, the economic drivers of the carbon price are twofold. Higher 
economic costs of global warming resulting from a higher flow damage coefficient (higher d) or 
higher current GDP give rise to a higher price of carbon. With a higher trend rate of economic 
growth, future damages (being proportional to future GDP) will be higher and thus the present 
discounted value of these damages and the optimal carbon price will be higher too. Furthermore, 
if the rate of economic growth is high and thus future generations are relatively richer than the 
current generation, there is less willingness among the current generation to undertake ambitious 
                                                            
10 The carbon price in Golosov et al. (2014) is the exact social cost of carbon in a model with endogenous 
manmade capital under the restrictions of logarithmic utility, full depreciation of manmade capital, 
exponential climate damage, and zero fossil fuel extraction costs. 
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climate policies (high IIA g  and thus a high SDR from (6)). This latter effect is captured by the 
negative effect of g on the growth-corrected SDR which dominates if growth IIA > 1. 
These geophysical, ethical, and economic drivers of the optimal carbon price are also the drivers 
of the fraction of the energy mix that is clean and the fraction of carbon emissions that are 
sequestrated as these increase in the carbon price can be seen from (1) and (2), respectively. As 
discussed in section 2, (1) and (2) also indicate that substitution for renewable energies and 
sequestration also increase if their marginal costs fall due to technical progress. 
  
4. Policy regimes, transition times and carbon budgets 
The emissions of carbon ends either by ongoing substitution of all fossil fuel for renewable 
energies or by full sequestration (i.e., when either tm  or ta  reaches 100%). Depending on which 
one stops the fossil era, we can identify the corresponding transition times and carbon budgets. 
For example, if the cost of using carbon-based energy (including the carbon tax) is greater than 
the cost of the carbon-free alternative, i.e. 0 0 0 1,G Y H H    full mitigation is optimal from the 
start and 1,  0.tm t    No sequestration is necessary and the carbon budget and transition time 
are irrelevant. In fact, we suppose the more realistic case where carbon-free technologies are not 
competitive today or in the near future, i.e., 0 0 0 1.G Y H H    This implies positive emissions with 
0 1m   and mt rising monotonically over time, given that renewable energy becomes competitive 
over time relative to their carbon-based alternatives. In this scenario it is optimal to start with a 
phase where fossil fuel is used alongside renewable energies. If 1 0 ,A Y only part of these fossil 
fuel emissions are abated initially. In this case two regimes, with partial and complete 
sequestration of carbon emissions, are possible, before renewables take over fully in the third 
regime. 
We first focus on the regime with partial sequestration, so at the time of transition to the carbon-
free era, T, all energy consists of renewables, i.e. 1tm   for all t  T, and not all emissions from 
burning fossil fuel are fully sequestrated yet, i.e., 1ta   for all t < T. There is no need for 
sequestration in the carbon-free era, so that 0ta   for all t  T. The following result summarises 
such a regime with partial sequestration. 
Result 2 (partial sequestration): If fossil fuel is completely removed from the energy mix before 
all emissions are fully sequestrated, i.e. mt = 1 for t  T and at < 1 for t < T, the optimal carbon 
price, the share of renewable energies in total energy, and the fraction of carbon emissions that 
are sequestrated follow from (7), (1) and (2), respectively. Transition to the carbon-free era 
10 
 
occurs once the cost of carbon-based energy, including the carbon price, has risen to just that of 
renewable energies or, equivalent, when mT = 1 has reached for some T. The optimal carbon 
budget corresponds to cumulative carbon emissions, 
( )
0 0
0
(1 )(1 ) .
T g r t
t tB a m Y e dt


     
Appendix 1 contains the formal statement and derivation of Result 3.11 
The relevant arbitrage conditions for a regime where full mitigation occurs before full 
sequestration are    10 1 0 1(1 ) / 1
m
aF A Rr T r T r T
T a T T Tm G e a e A a P H H e

        
 
 and 
 1/ 1.
a
Ar T
T Ta e P A

   Climate policy and technology jointly determine whether this regime 
occurs. We assume that there is sufficient technical change in renewable energy production, 
relative to cost reductions in dirty energy, so that the mitigation ratio rises with time until it 
reaches one and the switch to the carbon-free era takes place. Technological change and a carbon 
price rising at the rate of economic growth drive this transition. If there is no directed technical 
change whatsoever and no economic growth, the share of renewables in the energy mix is 
constant, 0 0 0
1
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, 0,
m
t
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
   
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 
 and the fraction of carbon emissions that is 
sequestrated is constant too, 0
1
, 0,
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t
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a t
A

 
   
 
 so there will never be a switch to the carbon-
free era. Hence, cumulative emissions rise forever and climate policy has become impotent. 
Carbon emissions cause global warming but the ensuing economic damages are evaluated as too 
low to warrant a more aggressive carbon tax. 
The second regime occurs if substitution for renewable energies occurs at a too low pace relative 
to the pace at which sequestration takes place in which case it is optimal to sequestrate all carbon 
emissions at time T  before all fossil in the energy mix is fully replaced by renewables at time 
T > T, with 1
0
1
' ln
A
A
T
r g Y
 
  
  
 and T from 
0 1 0 1
1
.F A Rr T r T r T
a
G e A e H H e

      This regime is 
relevant if the cost of sequestration is low and technical change in sequestration is high, both 
relative to the cost of switching to renewable energies. For this regime there are three distinct 
potential phases: phase 1 where fossil fuel is partially sequestrated and used alongside renewable 
energies during the period 0  t < T, phase 2 where fully sequestrated fossil fuel is used alongside 
                                                            
11 Our IAM with partial sequestration is solved by running equations (1)-(2) with (7) forward in time until 
there is a time t = T at which mt hits 1 from below and aT  <  1. The optimal cumulative carbon emissions 
(the carbon budget) then simply follow from cumulative use. 
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renewable energies during the period T  t < T, and possibly a phase 3 where only renewable 
energies are used and sequestration is no longer necessary for the period t  T. If technical change 
in the development of carbon-free alternatives is slow, phase 2 lasts longer and features a 
temporarily falling share of renewable in the energy mix, .tm  
Result 3 (full sequestration): If full sequestration takes place before all fossil fuel is removed 
from the energy mix, at = 1, for T  t < T, the optimal carbon price and share of renewable 
energy in the energy mix are given by (7) and (1). The fraction of emissions that are sequestrated 
in phase 1 follows from (2) before reaching the value of 1 in phase 2 at time T . The transition 
time to phase 3, the carbon-free era, T, occurs once the cost of fully sequestrated carbon-based 
energies including the carbon price has risen to just the cost of renewable energies. The carbon 
budget, B, equals cumulative use in phase 1, from time 0 to T. 
Appendix 1 contains the formal statement and derivation of Result 3.12 
Equations (1)-(2) with (6) and (7) define our back-of-the-envelope IAM. Climate policies in the 
form of substituting renewables in the energy mix and sequestration determine the transition time, 
T, at which the carbon era comes to an end, and the carbon budget B, by pricing carbon 
appropriately. From time T onwards, fossil fuel use is zero and all energy is carbon-free. Knowing 
the carbon budget, we can determine peak global warming (PW) using the relation 
PW = Temp0 + TCRE × B (cf., Allen, 2016), where TCRE is the transient climate response and 
Temp0 a constant. 
Pricing carbon makes sequestration profitable (abatement rate at positive) and increases the share 
of mitigation, thereby shortening the transition time and the carbon budget. A higher carbon price 
(e.g. because of a higher damage coefficient for global warming d which pushes up the whole 
carbon price trajectory) increases the share of renewable energies in total energy, increases the 
fraction of carbon emissions that is abated, and brings forward the transition to the carbon-free 
era. This cuts the optimal carbon budget and peak global warming. Generally, the effectiveness 
of carbon pricing depends on technological possibilities and prospects. If the cost of renewable 
energy is falling fast, i.e. large rR, carbon pricing only adds little effect to the technologically 
driven transition to sustainability. Innovations like horizontal drilling which lead to the shale gas 
revolution can be captured as a big negative shock to G0. Although the carbon price is unaffected, 
                                                            
12 Our IAM with full sequestration is solved by running equations (1) and (2) using (7) for the optimal 
carbon price forwards in time until there is a time t = T  at which at hits 1 from below and mT  <  1. There 
follows an intermediate phase with fossil fuel with full abatement and renewable energy used together from 
T to T until mT hits 1 from below. The optimal carbon budget corresponds to cumulative carbon emissions 
from time 0 to T. 
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the transition to the carbon free era is postponed as it is profitable to continue with fossil fuel for 
longer. Furthermore, the ratio of renewable energy in total energy drops instantaneously and as a 
consequence the optimal carbon budget and peak global warming are higher. A breakthrough in 
renewable energy production captured by a negative shock to H0 has the opposite effects. A strong 
enough breakthrough in sequestration technology also tilts the policy mix toward abatement away 
from mitigation, permitting a regime with 100% abatement (see section 7.3). If technical change 
in renewables, rR, is strong compared with that in fossil fuel extraction, rF, and sequestration, rA, 
carbon-free technologies eventually gets cheap enough to replace fossil fuel cum sequestration, 
so that the transition time T is finite. If technical change in renewable energies is sufficiently 
rapid, sequestration only plays an important transitional role in the intermediate phase before the 
economy abandons fossil fuel altogether. 
Without climate policy, i.e. Pt = 0, technological progress and cost-cutting in carbon-free 
technologies are still able to drive carbon emissions to zero. The introduction of a carbon price 
shortens this transition period. The carbon budget is small for a high and rapidly rising extraction 
cost of fossil fuel and social cost of carbon, and a low and rapidly falling cost of renewable energy 
and abatement. 
 
5. Optimal climate policies: benchmark calibration 
Table 1 gives the ethical, economic and geophysical assumptions underlying the benchmark 
calibration of our back-of-the-envelope IAM. Unless stated otherwise, this follows the DICE and 
RICE models (Nordhaus, 2010, 2015) for the ethical parameters and economic growth, cost and 
technological parameters, and baseline scenarios (see Appendix 3 for more details). As far as the 
ethics is concerned, time impatience is 1.5% per year and the coefficient of relative 
intergenerational inequality aversion, IIA, is 1.45. Given a trend rate of economic growth of 2% 
per year, the Keynes-Ramey rule implies an interest rate of 4.4% per year and thus the growth-
corrected social discount rate, SDR, is 2.4% per year.  
For the economics, energy use is 0.14 Giga tons of carbon per trillion dollars of world GDP 
(initially $73T) amounting to 10 GtC of emissions. The initial cost of fossil fuel is 7% of GDP or 
$515/tC, and we assume cost rises at 0.1% per year to capture higher costs as less fossil fuel 
reserves remain. The unit cost of fossil fuel is constant (resulting in a constant energy share in the 
absence of climate policy) while the unit cost of renewable increases as their share in the energy 
mix rises. The corresponding price elasticity is 0.55 and the rate of technical progress in carbon-
free energy is 1.25 % per year. Sequestration is not captured explicitly in the DICE model. We 
assume that the cost of sequestration is initially quite high, namely 20% of GDP (or $2936/tC), 
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and declines at the same rate of technical progress as renewables (at a rate of 1.25% per year). 
We set the cost of global warming at 1.9% of world GDP (measured in trillions of dollars) for 
every trillion ton of carbon.13 
We adopt the geophysics from the model of Golosov et al. (2014) and assume that 20% of carbon 
emissions remain forever in the atmosphere and the remainder returns back to the surface of the 
oceans and the earth at a speed of 0.23% per year. We add a mean lag of 10 years between the 
rise in temperature and the change in the stock of atmospheric carbon. Following Allen (2016), 
we let the transient climate response to cumulative emissions be 2oC per trillion tons of carbon.  
Since the ethics and the costs and benefits of climate policies in the near and very distant future 
are open for debate and to a much lesser extent the geophysics too, the assumptions in Table 1 
are to a certain extent subjective. Our framework, however, allows us to investigate the effects of 
changing these assumptions on optimal climate policies in a transparent, straightforward way (see 
sections 6-9). 
Table 1: Benchmark calibration 
Ethical: 
Rate of time impatience for exponential discounting: RTI = 1.5% per year 
Intergenerational inequality aversion and risk aversion:  IIA  = 1.45 
Growth-corrected social discount rate: SDR = 2.4% per year 
Economic: 
World economy:  GDP0 = 73 T$,  g = 2% per year 
Energy use per unit of world GDP:   = 0.14 GtC/T$,  r = 0 % per year 
Fossil fuel cost: G0 = 515 $/tC,  rE = -0.1% per year 
Renewable energy cost: H0 = 515 $/tC, H1 = 1150 $/tC, m = 2.8, m = 0.55, rR = 1.25% per year 
Sequestration (CCS) cost: A1 = 2936 $/tC, a = 2 so a = 1, rA = 1.25% per year 
Flow damage as fraction of world GDP:  d = 0.019 $/tC 
Geophysical: 
Coefficients permanent & transient box of carbon cycle: β0 = 0.2, β1 = 0.0023 
Average lag between temperature/damages and carbon stock: Tlag = 10 years 
Transient climate response to cumulative emissions: TCRE = 2oC/TtC 
 
Given our benchmark calibration in Table 1, the solid black and short-dashed blue lines in Figure 
1 are the outcomes under the optimal climate policies and under business as usual (BAU) where 
the carbon price is zero, respectively. Our simple rule for the optimal carbon price starts at $44/tC 
(or $12/tCO2) and then grows in line with the trend rate of economic growth at 2% per year – see 
the top panel. The black solid line in the bottom panel shows that the mitigation rate starts at 16% 
                                                            
13 Golosov et al. (2014) use a higher figure of 2.379% to allow for a small risk (6.8%) of a 30% catastrophic 
drop in world GDP at 6C. If we used this higher figure, all carbon prices would be 25% higher. 
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and then rises to 100% in 86 years, growing on average at 2% per year. Pricing carbon leads to 
1.5% of the remaining fossil fuel emissions being sequestrated initially (see the red dotted line in 
the bottom panel of Figure 1). Following (2), sequestration increases at a progress-adjusted 
growth rate of 3.25% per year. By the end of the carbon ear, a total of 784 GtC have been emitted, 
inducing peak warming of 2.9°C early in the next century due to the 10-year average lag in the 
climate system.  
Figure 1: Optimal climate policy under hyperbolic discounting 
 
 
 
Key: Under hyperbolic discounting without commitment (green dashed-dotted lines) climate policy is more 
ambitious than under exponential discounting (black lines), where less weight is placed on future 
generations’ welfare. Even in the absence of a carbon price (blue short-dashed lines) fossil fuels are slowly 
phased out due to the advance of carbon-free technologies. Carbon prices can be compared to the less 
plausible case of hyperbolic discounting with pre-commitment (brown long-dashed lines). 
Without a carbon price, cost reductions in the generation of renewable energy are the only drivers 
of the energy transition. Fossil fuels are used more and for longer, with mt in the second panel of 
Figure 2 rising slowly towards full decarbonisation in the next century. Without the carbon price 
stick, no sequestration efforts will be undertaken, increasing emissions further. If no additional 
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policy measures are imposed (such as fuel standards, renewable subsidies, a moratorium on coal, 
etc.), BAU leads to cumulative emissions of 1,778 GtC and peak warming of 4.9°C. Positive 
mitigation levels under BAU are solely driven by the gradual improvements in the cost 
competitiveness of renewable energy. If the cost differential between dirty and clean inputs were 
to remain constant, i.e. 0,R Fr r   carbon-based technologies would be used indefinitely, i.e., 
mt = 0, under BAU. 
Despite its simplicity, our IAM compare well with the fully-fledged DICE-2013R model to which 
we have calibrated our model parameters. In the absence of population growth, DICE reports an 
initial carbon price of $48/tC and mitigation rate of 17%. The rates of growth of the carbon price 
and mitigation are, however, significantly slower and cumulative emissions higher due to DICE’s 
long temperature lag of more than 100 years. In our simulations we have also verified that the 
approximation of a constant consumption share, used in our simple rule (7), is reasonable for our 
chosen calibration. Along the policy paths shown in Figure 1, this ratio varies between 93% and 
90% over time, since energy and damages constitutes only a modest share of GDP along an 
optimal path where climate damages are limited. 
 
6. Ethics: low discount rates for the long term and affluence of future generations 
Here we discuss the question of discounting, first in section 6.1 an extension of the benchmark 
model to hyperbolic discounting and then briefly discuss ethical considerations in connection with 
intergenerational inequality aversion and wealth of future generations in section 6.2. 
6.1. Hyperbolic discounting versus exponential discounting 
The rate of time impatience, RTI, represents the weight placed on future generations’ welfare and 
crucially determines how ambitious climate policy is. Our welfare function (5) with exponential 
discounting implies that RTI is constant. Given a constant rate of trend economic growth, the 
growth-corrected social discount rate, SDR, is constant too (see equation (6)). A smaller RTI 
lowers the SDR and increases the carbon price (7) and thus makes climate policy makes more 
ambitious. Our purpose is to extend our analysis to hyperbolic discounting, which nests our base 
calibration with exponential discounting and constant RTI as a special case. Empirical and 
theoretical arguments support the declining long-term discount rates being lower than short-term 
discount rates (e.g., Arrow et al., 2013, 2014). The presence of risk or heterogeneous agents have 
been put forward as a compelling arguments for certainty-equivalent rates that decline with long 
time horizons (e.g., Weitzman, 1994; 2001, Gollier and Zeckhauser, 2005). Microeconomic 
studies on procrastination suggest that people tend to delay beneficial but hard actions (Laibson, 
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1997).14 Our motivation for using generalised hyperbolic discounting is that it allows us to use a 
high short-run discount rate, ,  which we associate with the more market-based rate of time 
preference, and a much lower or zero long-run discount rate, which we associate with an ethical 
rate of time preference.15 
The general class of hyperbolic discounting has discounting function  1 ,atD t



   0.   For 
  0, this simplifies to exponential discounting, ,ttD e
  which was used in our benchmark 
welfare function (5). With ,   we get the case of hyperbolic discounting,  
1
1 .tD t

   The 
instantaneous discount rate at time t is defined as '/ / (1 )t t tD D t       and equals  at time 
zero and then declines to zero as time goes to infinity. With this type of discounting and in contrast 
to the benchmark case of exponential discounting, optimal (climate) policies are generally time 
inconsistent. Hence, if policy makers re-optimise at some future point of time and renege, they 
will choose different policies. We therefore distinguish between optimal climate policies with 
commitment and those without commitment. 
Result 4: With commitment and generalised hyperbolic discounting, the optimal carbon price is 
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   is the generalised exponential integral function.  
Proof: see Appendix 2.  
                                                            
14 In a sample 74% of respondents choose fruit and 26% chocolate when they can have it next week, but 
people choose 30% fruit and 70% chocolate when they get it today (Read and van Leeuwen, 1998); in a 
different example, 66% choose a low-brow and 34% high-brow video today but next week 37% a low-brow 
and 63% high-brow video (Read, Loewenstein and Kalyanaraman, 1999). So the self wants to be patient 
and delay gratification, but actions indicate instant gratification. This is why plans to quit smoking, exercise 
or lose weight are not followed through (Gruber and Koszegi, 2003). People join gym for $75/month but 
only visit on average 4 times a month, so average cost per visit is $19 instead of $10 on a PAYG basis 
which seems irrational (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2004). Similarly, people save less than their target 
saving (Bernheim, 1992; Choi et al., 2003; Public Agenda, 1997; Angeletos et al., 2001). 
15 Seminal applications of declining discount rates to climate change are Karp (2005), Fujii and 
Karp (2008), Karp and Tsur (2011), Gollier (2012), Gerlagh and Liski (2018), and Karp and Iverson (2018). 
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The initial optimal carbon price under hyperbolic discounting (8) is higher and rises at a faster 
rate than the price under exponential discounting (7), since the discount rate falls with longer time 
horizons. The optimal carbon price (8) assumes commitment to an announced time path of future 
carbon prices. If the policy makers renege on predecessors’ plans and re-optimise at some future 
date, the carbon price is lowered again (due to the relatively high discount rate for short horizons) 
and rises monotonically as time progresses. In equilibrium, the carbon price is recalculated in 
each period and current policymakers take this into account when announcing their policies.  
Result 5: The optimal carbon price under generalised hyperbolic discounting when policy makers 
cannot commit to announced future time paths of carbon prices is 
(8) 
0 0( / ) .
no commitment commitment
t tP Y Y P
   
Proof: Appendix 2 shows that this corresponds to the feedback Nash equilibrium, which is time 
consistent by construction and relevant when commitment is not feasible. 
We thus see that the optimal carbon price without commitment (8) follows a lower trajectory 
than the carbon price with commitment (8) as discount rates are reset to their initial, higher value 
in each period whereas they are allowed to decline if policy makers can commit. As a result, 
carbon prices grow at a slower pace, namely at the rate of trend economic growth. 
To illustrate how the assumption of generalised hyperbolic discounting affects climate policy, we 
calibrate the one-year discount rate for appraisal today to the one used by Nordhaus (2015), i.e. 
δ0 = 1.5% per year, and the one-year discount rate for in one century ahead to the one used by the 
Stern Review, i.e. δ100 = 0.1%/year. From / (1 ),t t     this gives 0    1.5% and 
= [ρ / δ100 – 1] / 100 = 0.14% per year. The discount rate is thus initially equal to the benchmark 
exponential rate but falls to 0.1%/year for a century ahead. Figure 1 and Table 2 report results for 
the case of generalised discounting and how they compare with the benchmark case of exponential 
discounting. 
The long-dashed red lines in Figure 1 indicates the outcome under hyperbolic discounting if there 
is no commitment to announced future climate policies. The initial carbon price is much higher, 
$92/tC instead of $44/tC, but still rises in line with world GDP at the trend rate of economic 
growth of 2% per year. If policymakers can commit future policymakers to announced plans, 
indicated by the long-dashed grey lines in Figure 1, the carbon price still starts at $92/tC, but rises 
initially more steeply at a rate 3.3% per year which then tapers off to a rate of 2% per year as the 
effect of declining discount rates fades. The declining discount rate thus makes climate policy 
more ambitious and especially so if policymakers can commit. If they renege and carbon prices 
are re-optimised after say 10 years, the carbon tax would be marked down by 8% and its growth 
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rate reset to 3.3%. As a comparison, merely reducing the discount rate and sticking to exponential 
discounting lowers the initial carbon price, P0, but leaves the growth rate of the carbon price 
unchanged. 
Table 2: Climate policy if future is discounted less heavily at longer horizons 
 Carbon price 
P0 
Sequestration 
a0 
Mitigation  
m0 
Carbon 
budget B 
End 
fossil era 
Peak 
warming 
Exponential discounting 
   (DICE) 
44 $/tC 1.5% 16.1% 784 GtC 86 yrs 2.9°C 
Hyperbolic discounting 
   (no commitment) 
92 $/tC 3.1% 24.4% 488 GtC 72 yrs 2.3°C 
Hyperbolic discounting 
   (with commitment) 
92 $/tC 3.1% 24.4% 436 GtC 68 yrs 2.2°C 
Business as usual   0 $/tC 0% 0% 1,778 GtC 118 yrs 4.9°C 
DICE 48 $/tC – 17% 1,171 GtC 110 yrs 3.3°C 
Key: With exponential discounting there is a constant discount rate of 1.5% per year. Hyperbolic 
discounting starts with the same initial discount rate which then drops off over time to 0.1% per year in a 
century’s time. This leads to a much more ambitious climate policy with higher carbon taxes, higher 
sequestration and mitigation rates, lower carbon budgets and a quicker end of the fossil era. As a result, 
peak warming is less than with exponential discounting and much less than under business as usual. If 
commitment to future climate policies is feasible, carbon is initially taxed the same but then it grows at a 
faster rate so that climate policy is more ambitious. The value of commitment is small as it lowers the 
carbon budget by mere 52 GtC and peak warming by 0.1°C. Under business as usual no carbon price is 
imposed and relative cost advances in renewable energy are the sole driver of decarbonisation. Here, the 
carbon era ends in the 22nd century with an excessive carbon budget and extreme levels of warming. 
 
Hyperbolic discounting without commitment doubles the initial carbon price. This boosts the 
share of renewables in the energy mix by half to 24% and doubles sequestration rates to 3%. The 
start of carbon-free era is brought forward to the second half of this century, the carbon budget 
brought down to 488 GtC, and global mean temperature limited to 2.3°C. If policymakers were 
to commit their future selves to their announcements about future climate policy, emissions and 
global warming would be reduced further to 436 GtC and 2.2°C due the faster rising carbon price. 
Further comparisons of outcomes under hyperbolic discounting with and without commitment, 
exponential discounting and BAU are presented in Table 2. 
Under the hyperbolic discounting case without commitment, the discount rate declined from 1% 
to 0.1% per year. The top part of Table 3 indicates that setting the constant, exponential discount 
rate RTI to this lower limit throughout gives even more weight to future generations and makes 
climate policy more ambitious. The initial rate increases to $108/tC, raising abatement and 
mitigation efforts significantly, limiting carbon emissions to 433 GtC and temperature increases 
to 2.2°C. 
 
Table 3: Ethic, economic, technological and geophysical drivers of optimal climate policies  
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 Carbon price 
P0 
Sequestration 
a0 
Mitigation 
m0 
Carbon budget 
 B 
Peak warming 
PW 
Constant discounting (DICE) 44 $/tC 1.5% 16.1% 784 GtC 2.9°C 
Lower discounting 108 $/tC 3.7% 26.5% 433 GtC 2.2°C 
Higher inequality aversion 28 $/tC 1.0% 12.7% 966 GtC 3.2°C 
Slower economic growth 55 $/tC 1.9% 18.6% 629 GtC 2.6°C 
Higher damage 87 $/tC 3.0% 23.6% 509 GtC 2.3°C 
Rapid mitigation progress  44 $/tC 1.5% 20.2% 388 GtC 2.1°C 
Sequestration breakthrough 44 $/tC 5.3% 19.9% 595 GtC 2.5°C 
More sophisticated carbon cycle 37 $/tC 1.3% 14.7% 854 GtC 3.0°C 
Positive climate feedback 48 $/tC 1.5% 16.4% 754 GtC 2.8°C 
 
6.2. Intergenerational inequality aversion and affluence of future generations 
The top part of Table 3 also indicates that higher intergenerational inequality aversion within our 
benchmark model with (benchmark) exponential discounting makes climate policy more 
lacklustre, given continued economic growth. By increasing IIA from 1.45 to 2, the interest rate 
increases from 4.4% to 5.5% per year and consumption of current generations is judged as more 
valuable. Less stringent climate policy is enacted. The carbon price falls to $28/tC and the carbon 
budget and peak warming increase to 966 GtC and 3.2°C, respectively.16 Note that the effect of 
IIA is stronger if the trend rate of economic growth is higher and future generations are relatively 
more affluent. 
 
7. Economics: damages, economic growth, and technical progress 
Table 3 also indicates that doubling the flow damage coefficient parameter (d = $0.038/tC) 
doubles the carbon price to $87/tC (or $24/tCO2) and implies a more ambitious climate policy. 
This nearly cuts the carbon budget in half to 509 GtC and limits the temperature rise to 2.3°C. 
7.1. Effects of more pessimism about future economic growth 
A slowdown in global economic growth to g = 1% per year makes future generations less affluent 
relative to current generations and thus makes current generations more willing to make sacrifices 
to curb future global warming as is evident from the decrease in the SDR especially if the IIA is 
high. The initial carbon price increases to $55/tC. There is an offsetting effect since a lower 
growth rate of the economy also means a lower growth rate of damages from global warming, 
which pushes down the SDR and depresses carbon pricing. The former effect dominates, since 
                                                            
16 Our results for exponential discounting are not that different from using DICE-2013R: a RTI of 0.1% 
gives an initial carbon price of $146/tC compared to our $108/tC. Also, raising the IIA to 2 gives a carbon 
price of $28/tC just like our back-on-the-envelope IAM. 
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our benchmark calibration has IIA > 1. A lower rate of economic growth also reduces the growth 
rate of the carbon price. Table 3 shows that for our benchmark calibration the initial increase 
outweighs the slower growth of the optimal carbon price. As a result, carbon emissions and global 
warming are curbed by 155 GtC or 0.3°C.  
7.2. Optimistic scenarios for technical progress in renewables production and sequestration 
The DICE calibration used in our benchmark calibration is arguably too pessimistic about the 
potential of carbon-free technologies. Figure 2 and the bottom part of Table 3 therefore show the 
effects of doubling the speed of technological progress in carbon-free technologies (rR = 2.5% per 
year) and of a breakthrough in sequestration technology, lowering the initial cost of full 
sequestration to that of renewable energies (A1 = 822 $/tC). Note from Result 1 that these cost 
variations leave the carbon price unchanged, but do affect the deployment of renewables and 
sequestration technologies and thereby the carbon budget and peak warming. 
Figure 2: Technological drivers of climate policies 
 
Key: Technological improvements in renewable energies have a significant impact on the carbon budget 
and peak warming while reductions in the cost of sequestration mostly affect the composition of emission 
reduction, phasing in sequestration more slowly while completely switching over to renewables is delayed. 
Doubling the speed in renewable innovation, rR, ramps up the adoption rate of renewables in the 
energy mix which reaches complete decarbonisation 16 years earlier than under the DICE-
calibrated baseline. The carbon budget is reduced to 315 GtC and peak warming curbed to 2.2°C. 
A technological breakthrough in sequestration, lowering the cost of decarbonisation under 
complete sequestration to that of full decarbonisation, has little effect on the statistics reported in 
Table 3. The cost reduction in sequestration relative to renewables lowers initial substitution 
efforts in the energy mix slightly while tripling sequestration. The cheap availability of 
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sequestration leads to less emissions left unabated but pushes back the carbon-free era by over a 
decade. The carbon budget falls by 114 GtC and peak warming to 2.6°C.  
Given a strategy to price carbon, energy mix mitigation and sequestration policies can take on the 
two regimes discussed in section 4. While regime I with partial sequestration dominates in most 
simulations, regime II with full sequestration occurs under the sequestration breakthrough 
scenario. After a long phase 1 with partial sequestration, full sequestration (phase 2) occurs briefly 
at the end of century before all fossil fuel is removed from the energy mix shortly after. 
Allen (2016) assumes that, while getting rid of all fossil fuel is never cost-effective, the share of 
renewables in the energy mix rises steadily with temperature over time and sequestrated emissions 
grow exponentially with sequestration continuing indefinitely. Our framework demonstrates 
important interactions between both policy instruments: once all emissions are sequestrated in 
phase 2, the replacement of fossil fuel by renewables stalls and rises more slowly as the pressure 
to limit climate change has been alleviated and relative cost considerations are the only 
determinants of the optimal policy mix between sequestration and substitution. In general, 
calibrated simulations show that bringing more renewable in the energy mix is the most important 
lever to avoid climate change with sequestration lowering transitions during the transition to the 
carbon-free era. 
 
8. Geophysics: worsening of absorptive capacity of the oceans with global warming 
Our benchmark model of sections 2-5 has a simplified 2-box model of carbon dynamics and 1-
box model of temperature dynamics. Typically, the geophysics is modelled in a more 
sophisticated way. If we have a K-box model for the carbon cycle, we have 
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It is straightforward to demonstrate that the optimal carbon price in Result 1 then generalises to 
(7) 0 2 00 0
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For example, the IPCC uses the 4-box model for the carbon dynamics and 2-box model for the 
temperature dynamics put forward by Joos et al. (2013). Table 3 shows that the optimal climate 
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policies are not much affected when we take the 4-box instead of the 2-box model.17 With the 
initial carbon price falling from $43.5 to $36.9/tC, the carbon era lasts slightly longer, the carbon 
budget increases by 70 GtC and peak warming by 0.1°C. Following Millar et al. (2017), we also 
introduce positive feedback to the benchmark 2-box model in making the dissipation coefficients 
in (3) endogenous and hence representing the rate of absorption of carbon by the oceans as a 
decreasing function of global warming.18 Table 3 shows that the carbon price path and the 
substitution for renewable energies and sequestration rates are now slightly higher than either the 
linear 2-box or 4-box model for the carbon dynamics without positive feedback loops. This is 
because policy makers pursue a more ambitious climate policy to avoid unleashing unwelcome 
positive feedback loops.  
 
9. Politics: international climate deal stalemates 
So far we have assumed that countries in the world jointly determine policies addressing climate 
change as a global problem with a common global price of carbon. This presumes that lump-sum 
transfers flow from rich to poor countries to make sure that the internationally cooperative 
outcome can be sustained by all countries, even those that are poorer. After thirty years of 
international negotiations and despite some glimmers of hope at the Paris 2015 summit, the world 
is still far from an international deal on climate policy. One of the reasons for this is that rich 
countries do not want to compensate the poor countries enough for implementing global climate 
policy (Helm, 2012). It is therefore of interest to compare the global first-best optimum presented 
in Result 1 with the outcomes when countries maximise their own welfare and do not cooperate 
with each other.19 One can distinguish two non-cooperative outcomes: a no-commitment outcome 
(or feedback Nash equilibrium) when countries cannot commit to future policies and condition 
their climate policies on the state of the economy (i.e., the stock of atmospheric carbon) and a 
commitment outcome (or open-loop Nash equilibrium) when each country can commit (van der 
Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992). In our case, the two non-cooperative outcomes coincide as the only 
                                                            
17 We keep our 1-box model of the temperature dynamics. The calibrated coefficients for (3) with K = 4 
are β0 = 0.217, β11 = 0.0025, β12 = 0.0274, β13 = 0.2323, β21 = 0.286, β22 = 0.360, β23 = 0.352, and l = 3.2. 
See also appendix 3. 
18 In particular, we model this by assuming that the dissipation rate decreases linearly in cumulative 
emissions which themselves can be approximated linearly by time. Our short-cut captures the essence of 
positive feedback mechanism of Millar et al. (2017) while still allowing for an analytical solution presented 
in appendix 4. 
19 Our framework limits international movements to energy, whilst there is no further international trade in 
goods and services and no international movement of factors of production. This rather radical form of 
market incompleteness is not very realistic, but it gives tractable results and has been used before in 
international climate economics (Nordhaus, 2010; Hassler and Krusell, 2012). 
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state variables are the permanent and transient stocks of carbon in the atmosphere and our rules 
for the optimal climate policies are independent of these.20  
We attribute at each point in time country-specific flow damages from global warming to each 
country i, i.e., ,i id Y  so that global flow damages sum to 1
N
i ii
d Y dY

  where the weighted average 
of the flow damage coefficients is 
1
/ .
N
i ii
d d Y Y

  In the non-cooperative case, countries only 
account for their country-specific damage when setting a price for carbon.  
Result 6: The optimal carbon price for the non-cooperative outcome is 
(9) 0
ig t
it i iP Y e  
0 0
1
1 1
1
  
 ( 1) .
i i i
i i
i i i i
SDR SDR SDR Tlag
with d
and SDR RTI IIA g
 




  
  
   
  
  
 
where the fraction of renewable energies in the energy mix and the fraction of fossil fuel that is 
sequestrated are given by (1) and (2), respectively. 
Due to international free-rider problems, non-cooperative carbon prices are a factor N lower than 
under international policy cooperation if countries are equal in size and other respects. Poorer 
countries tend to suffer more from global warming (high di) but still their desired carbon price is 
typically lower due to their GDP being much lower. To the extent that poor countries are catching 
up and have higher growth rates, their desired carbon prices will be lower still (provided their IIA 
exceeds unity). The transition to the carbon-free era will take longer under non-cooperation, 
especially if GDP levels and growth rates are distributed unevenly.21 Given lower carbon prices 
mitigation and sequestration rates are also lower without an international climate deal, especially 
in poorer countries. 
To illustrate, we use the regional damage coefficients and initial regional GDP levels (from the 
World Bank data base) presented in Table 4. This disaggregation follows the RICE-2010 IAM 
(Nordhaus, 2010) and uses the ensuing regional flow damage coefficients (Hassler and Krusell, 
2012). In RICE a 2.5% increase in global mean temperature causes an output-weighted loss of 
1.5%, but in Africa and Europe this figure is 2.61 and 1.89 times as much, respectively, whilst in 
                                                            
20 In assuming a balanced growth path in the calculation of the optimal price of carbon, we ignore the 
dynamics of capital accumulation as these converge much faster than the carbon cycle. If one were to allow 
for these dynamics, the subgame-perfect (or feedback) and open-loop Nash equilibrium outcomes would 
generally differ. 
21 Note that country-specific Ti results from 
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China and the US these ratios are only 0.15 and 0.3, respectively. The damage coefficients for 
global warming are thus high in Africa and in Europe compared to the US and especially China. 
Looking at regional flow damages per ton of carbon in the atmosphere (the third row in Table 4), 
we see that they are highest in Europa (due to both a high GDP and a high damage coefficient) 
and the rest of the world (ROW) but lowest in Africa (due to a low GDP and despite a high 
damage coefficient) and China (due its relatively low damage coefficient). This suggests that 
Europe has a much stronger interest in an international climate deal than Africa or China and also 
more the than the US. The choice of regions is naturally arbitrary but it serves to illustrate the 
biases in national climate policies when an international climate deal has not been achieved. 
Table 4: Calibration of damages by world regions 
Regional damage flow coefficients (as multiples of global coefficient d): 
dAfrica = 2.61 d, dEurope = 1.89 d, dUS = 0.3 d, dChina = 0.15 d, dROW = 1.13 d 
Regional GDP levels for 2015: 
GDP0,Africa = 2 T$, GDP0,Europe = 16.8 T$, GDP0,US = 18 T$, GDP0,China = 10.8 T$, GDP0,ROW = 25.7T$ 
Regional flow damages per ton of carbon in the atmosphere (di GDPi): 
Africa $0.0992/tC, Europe $0.603/tC, US $0.103/tC, China $0.031/tC, ROW $0.552/tC  
 
Figure 3 and Table 5 presents global emissions and regional climate policy when countries or 
regional blocks cooperate with each other and when they do not. We assume that cost and social 
welfare parameters are the same in all regions of the world.22 Due to international free-rider 
problems self-interested climate policy without an international agreement is significantly less 
ambitious than the first-best outcome discussed in the previous sections with lower shares of 
renewables in the energy mix and sequestration ratios, later transitions to full sequestration and a 
fully carbon-free energy mix, and consequently higher emissions in total for the global economy. 
The average carbon price without a climate deal starts at only $11/tC, only a quarter of what it 
would be under international policy cooperation. Global warming peaks thus at 4.0°C instead of 
2.9°C and the carbon budget is 1,352 GtC instead of 784 GtC. These poor outcomes under non-
cooperation are likely to be even worse when countries in each regional bloc do not cooperate. 
Without international transfers from rich to poor countries, the poorest regions in the global 
economy have little appetite to implement ambitious climate policies. This is why Africa and to 
a lesser extent China have relatively low carbon prices and thus relatively low abatement and 
mitigation ratios. The US has, of course, the highest level of GDP, but its optimal non-cooperative 
                                                            
22 We only disaggregate damages and output and keep technological coefficients uniform across regions. 
A more detailed analysis would have to account for differentials in growth rates and technological progress 
across regions. 
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carbon tax is nevertheless very low as the damage coefficient for the US is relatively small. Due 
to a very low damage coefficient and a low level of GDP, China has the lowest price of carbon. 
Consequently, these two regions take the longest to reduce emissions to zero (see left panel in 
Figure 3). Given their high initial carbon prices, Europe and the rest of the world are the quickest 
in phasing out fossil fuels. Due to the absence of regional differences in economic and 
technological growth rates, Africa and the US are following the same mitigation and abatement 
paths. A more disaggregated analysis would account for such differences which, due to lower 
technological capabilities in Africa than in the US, would lead to lower efforts to replace fossil 
fuel by renewables in Africa and strengthen ambition in the US. 
Figure 3: Non-cooperative regional climate policies 
 
Key: Failure to reach a global climate deal increases emissions. Each country tries to avoid its own 
damages but ignores those inflicted on others. Differences in exposure to climate change and income levels 
lead to varying degrees of ambition in climate policy. Europe with high levels of exposure and income 
decarbonises first; China with low exposure and income takes longest to drive emissions to zero. 
 
Table 5: Regional climate policy and global carbon budgets 
 Region 
Carbon price 
P0 
Abatement  
a0 
Mitigation  
m0 
Carbon budget 
B 
Africa 3.1 $/tC 0.1% 3.8% 44 GtC 
China 1.0 $/tC 0.0% 1.9% 253 GtC 
Europe 18.9 $/tC 0.6% 10.2% 257 GtC 
US 3.2 $/tC 0.1% 3.8% 393 GtC 
Rest of the World (RoW) 17.4 $/tC 0.6% 9.7% 405 GtC 
Global cooperative 44 $/tC 1.5% 16.1% 784 GtC 
Global non-cooperative 11 $/tC 0.4% 7.1% 1,352 GtC 
Business as usual 0 $/tC 0% 0% 1,778 GtC 
Key: Regional climate policy is significantly less ambitious than under global policy coordination. 
Aggregating the regional policy responses (upper part of the table) to global averages (lower part), gives 
a carbon price of a quarter of the globally optimal, a carbon budget of 1,352 GtC, and peak warming of 
4.0°C which compares favourably with 4.9°C under business-as-usual but is far above the 2.9°C under 
international policy coordination and cooperation. 
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10. Conclusions 
The central questions of climate policy are how much and how fast to replace fossil fuel with 
renewable energies in the energy mix; how much and how fast to sequestrate emissions from 
using fossil fuel; and how to set the initial and future prices of carbon both under non-cooperative 
and cooperative decision making in the global economy to achieve these goals. Much of the 
academic debate in climate change economics has focused on the difference of various estimates 
for the optimal carbon price, perhaps most prominently in the debate between Nordhaus and Stern 
about discount rates. We present a simple framework with which these questions can be 
meaningfully addressed without resorting to one of the large-scale numerical Integrated 
Assessment Models. Our back-of-the-envelope Integrated Assessment Model provides simple 
rules for the optimal price of carbon and for optimal share of renewables in the energy mix and 
sequestration policies and allows translation of these into climate objectives such as carbon 
budgets and peak warming. Our framework calculates the welfare-maximising carbon price but 
also pays attention to the dynamics of the technological capabilities available at different points 
of time. The carbon price and relative cost competitiveness determine the adoption and diffusion 
rate of carbon-free technologies. We see our analysis as complementary to more detailed, often 
numerical, simulations as we focus on the key drivers and ignore potential cross-interactions 
between capital accumulation and climate policy. Our aim was to develop a simple and easy-to-
understand framework that brings together various aspects of climate change economics and can 
be used for teaching and for communication to policy makers to illustrate four key messages.  
First, the optimal price of carbon and the ambition of climate policy are crucially driven by ethical 
considerations such as the discount rate and relative intergenerational inequality aversion on how 
to trade off the welfare of future and current generations. In a DICE-based calibration with a 
constant rate of time preference of 1.5% per year the current carbon price is $44/tC (or $12/tCO2) 
which increases to $146/tC if one adopts the discount rate of the Stern Review. We have shown 
how the standard framework with exponential discounting can be extended to allow for high 
discount rates at short horizons and much lower discount rates at long horizons by adopting a 
hyperbolic discounting approach. This hybrid case, which is our preferred estimate, respects the 
criticism of Nordhaus and Stern of each other’s approach and significantly boosts the optimal 
price of carbon to $92/tC (or $25/tCO2) and the speed at which fossil fuel is removed from the 
energy mix and emissions are sequestered to limit peak warming to 2.3°C. Our framework takes 
into account that future policymakers might not want to respect the past climate pledges; our 
solution does not assume commitment. If future policymakers could commit to announcements 
about future policies, climate policy is more ambitious but time-inconsistent. The ability to 
commit, however, has minor implications for the carbon budget and peak warming. 
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Second, the qualitative nature of climate policy depends on how the economic and global warming 
costs of renewable and fossil energies and sequestration develop with time. If technical progress 
in renewable energy production is fast compared with that in developing sequestration 
technology, the economy replaces all fossil fuel by renewable energies (100% mitigation) before 
all fossil fuel is fully sequestrated. If technological progress in sequestration is relatively fast or 
if there is a breakthrough in sequestration technology, there will be an intermediate regime where 
all fossil fuel is fully sequestered before the economy finally transitions to using only renewable 
energies. During this intermediate phase of full sequestration, the urgency of climate policy 
recedes and the share of renewables in energy generation stalls. Due to current cost conditions 
and the ugly dynamics of NIMBY politics and running out of holes to put sequestrated carbon in, 
this second regime appears unlikely. 
Third, as far as the geophysics is concerned, using a 4-box instead of a 2-box model of the carbon 
does not affect the optimal carbon price much. But allowing for the capacity of the oceans to 
absorb CO2 to diminish as oceans heat up, pushes up the optimal carbon price somewhat in order 
to avoid such positive feedback loops being set in motion. 
Fourth, lack of international climate deals implies that carbon pricing and thus climate policies 
are nationally determined and lacklustre with the result that the necessary transition to the carbon-
free era is much delayed and peak warming increases by an additional 1.1°C. Part of the problem 
is failure of the rich countries to compensate the poor countries adequately for implementing an 
ambitious carbon price. This is why it is crucial to start with a club of countries who implement 
ambitious climate policies and generate mechanisms to get as many countries to join. A relatively 
low penalty trade tariff on countries outside the club of 5%, waived once they join, can lead to 
large and stable coalitions of countries and overcome free-riding in international climate policy 
(Nordhaus, 2015). 
It is straightforward to extend these back-of-the-envelope calculations to allow for more convex 
damages, stock-dependent fossil fuel extraction costs, sequestration costs that increase with the 
stock of sequestrated carbon, and learning by doing in renewables production (see Appendix 5). 
Since there is mounting evidence that climate policy shapes technological progress and research 
& development and that directed technical change and path dependence matters (e.g., Acemoglu 
et al., 2016; Aghion et al., 2016), it is important to allow for such endogenous feedbacks. 
Our analysis solely considered climate-related damages to the economy without considering other 
non-climate implications of carbon-based processes. According to some estimates, such costs to 
health and well-being are of the same magnitude as the climate-related damages and might be 
important drivers of climate policy in certain regions (West et al., 2013; Ščasný, et al. 2015). E.g., 
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while our regional analysis suggests that China should adopt few efforts to eliminate fossil fuel 
from the energy mix in the absence of a climate deal, non-climate co-benefits have been the key 
motivation for decarbonisation of industrial processes and fast ramping-up of renewable energy 
sources in this region. Our simple rules could be easily extended to include such additional costs 
of fossil fuels by adjusting the damage coefficients and thus the carbon price upwards.  
Our simple framework may give too cautious answers as more convex global warming damages, 
damages to the growth rate of the economy and the risk of a cascade of catastrophic events which 
are more likely to occur at higher temperatures lead to a more aggressive climate policy (Dietz 
and Stern, 2015; Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; Lemoine and Traeger, 2016; Cai et al., 2016), 
but can be extended to allow for such factors. If future climate policy turns out to be not ambitious 
enough and takes too long to materialise, there will be no other option than to attempt to curb 
negative carbon emissions via bio-energy with CCS, direct air capture or enhanced weathering as 
these forms of “negative emissions” may be needed to bridge the gap between cuts to meet global 
mitigation targets and current emissions trends (e.g., Fuss, et al., 2014). 
Finally, as can be seen from Table 2, the usual DICE damages lead to peak global warming higher 
than 2°C (unless one uses the very low discount rate of the Stern Review or the very low long-
run discount rates that prevail under hyperbolic discounting with commitment). This contradicts 
the aims of the 2016 Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 2°C and to aim to for peak 
warming of 1.5°C. The Paris caps on peak global warming are, on the one hand, scientifically 
motivated as higher temperatures would lead to intolerably high risks of tipping points, and, on 
the other hand, politically motivated to keep small island states that are at risk of flooding aboard. 
One approach is to revise the damages from global warming upwards to ensure that peak global 
warming remains below 2°C or 1.5°C. The integrated assessment literature, in contrast, ignores 
damages from global warming altogether and minimises the present discounted value of costs 
subject to the constraint that peak warming cannot exceed 2°C or 1.5°C or alternatively that 
cumulative carbon emissions stay within the safe carbon budget corresponding to the cap on 
global warming. The resulting price of carbon must rise more rapidly to reflect that carbon gets 
scarcer as the carbon budget approaches exhaustion. In fact, the carbon price follows a Hotelling 
path and thus rises more rapidly at a rate equal to the rate of interest instead of the rate of economic 
growth (e.g., Nordhaus, 1982; Tol, 2013; Bauer et al., 2015).23 One way of integrating the welfare 
maximisation approach based on estimates of global warming and the cost minimisation approach 
                                                            
23 If there is inertia between changes in global mean temperature and the stock of atmospheric carbon, the 
cost-minimising carbon price follows an inverse U-shaped path and grows more slowly than the Hotelling 
path (Lemoine and Rudik, 2017). However, recent insights from atmospheric science indicates that this 
inertia is very small and this implies that the cost-minimising carbon price follows a Hotelling path. This 
means that carbon price is much more quickly and more vigorously.  
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based on a cap on global warming or cumulative emissions is to maximise welfare net of global 
warming subject to the cap on peak warming or cumulative emissions. This gives a cost-
minimising price of carbon that is higher than under unconstrained welfare maximization and that 
grows at a rate somewhere in between the interest rate and the rate of economic growth (van der 
Ploeg, 2018; Dietz and Venmans, 2018). 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., U. Akcigit, D. Hanley and W. Kerr (2016). Transition to clean technology, Journal 
of Political Economy, 124, 1, 52-104.  
Aengenheyster, M., Q.Y. Feng, F. van der Ploeg and H.A. Dijkstra (2018). Risk and the point of 
no return for climate action, Earth System Dynamics, in press. 
Aghion, P., A. Dechezleprêtre, D. Hémous, R. Martin and J. Van Reenen (2016). Carbon taxes, 
path dependency and directed technical change: evidence from the auto industry, Journal 
of Political Economy, 124, 1, 1-51,   
Allen, M. (2016). Drivers of peak warming in a consumption-maximizing world, Nature Climate 
Change, 6, 684-686. 
Arrow, K., M. Cropper, C. Gollier, B. Groom, G. Heal, R. Newell, W. Nordhaus, R. Pindyck, W. 
Pizer, P. Portney, T. Sterner, R. Tol, and M. Weitzman (2013). Determining benefits and 
costs for future generations, Science, 341, 349-350. 
Arrow, K., M. Cropper, C. Gollier, B. Groom, G. Heal, R. Newell, W. Nordhaus, R. Pindyck, W. 
Pizer, P. Portney, T. Sterner, R. Tol, and M. Weitzman (2014). Should governments use 
a declining discount rate in project analysis?, Review of Environmental Economics and 
Policy, 8, 145-163. 
Baldwin, E., Y. Cai and K. Kuralbayeva (2018). Build now, regret later? Infrastructure and 
climate policy, mimeo, Grantham Institute, London School of Economics. 
Barrage, L. (2014). Sensitivity analysis for Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2014): 
“Optimal taxes on fossil fuels in general equilibrium”, www.lintbarrage.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/GHKT_2014_ECTA_SuppBarrage.pdf. 
Barrage, L. (2018). Be careful what you calibrate for: social discounting in general equilibrium, 
Journal of Public Economics, 160C, 33-49. 
Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and Statecraft, Oxford University Press. 
Bauer, N., V. Bosetti, M. Hamdi-Cheriff, A. Kitous, D. McCollum, A. Mjean, S. Rao, H. Turton, 
L. Paroussos, S. Ashina, K. Calvin, K. Wada and D. van Vuuren (2015). CO2 emission 
mitigation and fossil fuel markets: dynamic and international aspects of climate policy, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90(A), 243-256. 
Belfiori, M. E. (2017). Carbon pricing, carbon sequestration, and social discounting, European 
Economic Review, 96, 1-7. 
Belfiori, M. E. and T. Iverson (2018). Burn coal? The supply-side case for carbon capture and 
storage, mimeo, Colorado State University.  
Below, D. von (2012). Optimal carbon taxes with social and private discounting, mimeo., Oxcarre, 
University of Oxford. 
Bijgaart, I. van den, R. Gerlagh, L. Korsten and M. Liski (2016). A simple rule for the social cost 
of carbon, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 77, 75-94. 
30 
 
Bremer, T.S. and F. van der Ploeg (2018). The risk-adjusted carbon price, OxCarre Research 
Paper 203, University of Oxford. 
Cai, Y., T.M. Lenton and T.S. Lontzek (2016). Risk of multiple interacting tipping points should 
encourage rapid CO2 emission reduction, Nature Climate Change, 6, 520-525. 
Caldeira, K.L. and K. Ricke (2014). Maximum warming occurs about one decade after a carbon 
dioxide emission, Environmental Research Letters, 9, 12, 124002. 
Dietz, S. and N. Stern (2015). Endogenous growth, convexity of damages and climate risk: how 
Nordhaus’ framework supports deep cuts in emissions, Economic Journal, 125, 583, 574-
620. 
Dietz, S. and F. Venmans (2018). Cumulative carbon emissions and economic policy: in search 
of general principles, CCCEP working paper 285, Centre for Climate Change Economics 
and Policy. 
Fuss, S., J.G. Canadell, G.P. Peters, M. Tavoni, R.M. Andrew, P. Ciais, R.B. Jackson, C.D. Jones, 
F. Kraxner, N. Nakicenoviz, C. Le Queré, M.R. Raupach, A. Sharifi, P. Smith and Y. 
Yamagata (2014). Betting on negative emissions, Nature Climate Change, 4, 10, 850-
853.Fujii, T. and L. Karp (2008). Numerical Analysis of Non-Constant Pure Rate of Time 
Preference: A Model of Climate Policy, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 56, 1, 83-101. 
Gerlagh, R. and M. Liski (2018). Carbon prices for the next thousand years, Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 16, 1, 1-44. 
Gollier, C. (2012). Pricing the Planet's Future: The Economics of Discounting in an Uncertain 
World. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Gollier, C. and R. Zeckhauser (2005). Aggregation of Heterogeneous Time Preferences, Journal 
of Political Economy, 113, 4, 878-896. 
Golosov, M., J. Hassler and P. Krusell and A. Tsyvinski (2014). Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in 
general equilibrium, Econometrica, 82, 1, 48-88. 
Hassler, J. and P. Krusell (2012). Economics and climate change: integrated assessment in a 
multi-region world, Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 5, 974-1000. 
Helm, D. (2012). The Carbon Crunch: How We’re Getting Climate Change Wrong – And How 
to Fix It, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut. 
Iverson, T. and L. Karp (2018). Carbon taxes and commitment with non-constant time preference, 
Working Paper, Colorado State University. 
Joos, F., R. Roth, J. Fuglestvedt, G. Peters, I. Enting, W. v. Bloh, V. Brohkin, E. Burke, M. Eby, 
N. Edwards et al. (2013). Carbon dioxide and climate impulse response functions for the 
computation of greenhouse gas metrics: a multi-model analysis, Atmospheric Chemistry 
and Physics, 13, 5, 2793-2825. 
Karp, L. (2005). Global warming and hyperbolic discounting, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 
2-3, 261-282.  
Karp, L. and A. Rezai (2018). Asset prices and climate policy, mimeo, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
Karp, L. and Y. Tsur (2011). Time perspective and climate change policy, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 62, 1, 1-14. Laibson, D. (1997). Golden 
eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 2, 443-477. 
Lemoine, D. and I. Rudik (2017). Steering the climate system: using inertia to lower the cost of 
policy, American Economic Review, 107(10), 2947-2957. 
31 
 
Lemoine, D. and C.P. Traeger (2016). Economics of tipping the climate dominoes, Nature 
Climate Change, 6, 514-519. 
Manley, D., J. Cust and G. Cecchinato (2017). Stranded nations: the climate policy implications 
for fossil fuel-rich developing countries, mimeo. 
McGlade, C. and P. Ekins (2015). The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when 
limiting global warming to 2 oC, Nature, 517, 187-190. 
Millar, R.J., Z.R. Nicholls, P. Friedinglingstein and M.R. Allen (2017). A modified impulse-
response representation of the global near-surface air temperature and atmospheric 
concentration response to carbon dioxide emissions, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 
17, 7213-7228. 
Nordhaus, W. (1982). How fast should we graze the global commons?, American Economic 
Review, 72(2), 242-246.  
Nordhaus, W. (1991). To slow or not to slow: the economics of the greenhouse effect, Economic 
Journal, 101, 407, 920-937. 
Nordhaus, W. (2008). A Question of Balance. Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut.  
Nordhaus, W. (2010). Economic aspects of global warming in a post-Copenhagen world, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 26, 11721-11726. 
Nordhaus W. (2014). Estimates of the social cost of carbon: concepts and results from the DICE-
2013R model and alternative approaches, Journal of the Association of Environmental 
and Resource Economists, 1, 273-312. 
Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate clubs: overcoming free-riding in international climate policy, 
American Economic Review, 105, 4, 1339-1370. 
Pindyck, R.S. (2013). Climate change policy: what do the models tell us?, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 51, 860-872. 
Ploeg, F. van der (2018). The safe carbon budget, Climatic Change, 147, 47-59. 
Ploeg, F. van der and A. Rezai (2017). Cumulative emissions, untapped tapped fossil fuel and the 
optimal carbon tax, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 116, 216-222. 
Ploeg, F. van der and A. Rezai (2018). Climate policy and stranded carbon assets: a financial 
perspective, OxCarre Research Paper, University of Oxford. 
Ploeg, F. van der and A.J. de Zeeuw (1992). International aspects of pollution control, 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 2, 117-139. 
Rezai, A. and F. van der Ploeg (2016). Intergenerational inequality aversion, growth, and the role 
of damages: Occam’s rule for the global carbon tax, Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists, 3, 493-522. 
Ricke, K. and K. Calderia (2014). Maximum warming occurs about one decade after a carbon 
dioxide emission, Environmental Research Letters, 9, 124002. 
Ščasný, M., E. Massetti, J. Melichar and S. Carrara (2015). Quantifying the ancillary benefits of 
the Representative Concentration Pathways on air quality in Europe, Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 62(2), 383-415. 
Schmitt, A. (2014). Optimal carbon and income taxation, mimeo, Ifo Institut, Munich. 
Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
Stern, N. (2016). Economics: current climate models are grossly misleading, Nature, 530, 407-
409. 
32 
 
Tol, R.S.J. (2013). Targets for global climate policy: an overview, Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control, 37(5), 911-928. 
Wagner, G. and M. Weitzman (2015). Climate Shock: The Economic Consequences of a Hotter 
Planet, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
West, J.J., S.J. Smith, R.A. Silva, V. Naik, Y. Zhang, Z. Adelman, M.M. Fry, S. Anenberg, 
L.W. Horowitz and J.-F. Lamarque (2012). Co-benefits of mitigating global greenhouse 
gas emissions for future air quality and human health, Nature Climate Change 3, 885–
889. 
Weitzman, M. L. (1994). On the “environmental” discount rate, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 26, 200-209. 
Weitzman, M. L. (2001). Gamma discounting, American Economic Review, 91, 260-271. 
 
A1 
 
Appendix 1: Proof of Results 1 - 3 
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Appendix 2: Pricing carbon under hyperbolic discounting 
With hyperbolic discounting the Hamiltonian for this problem is 
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where ,Pt Tt   and t  are the (discounted) co-states for the dynamics of ,
P T
t tE E and tE  at time t, 
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Again, for purposes of deriving our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon only, we suppose 
that along a steady growth path, c is approximately constant or that IIA = 0. Hence, (A10) gives 
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We achieve these results and avoid potential problems of multiplicity by solving the model for a 
finite horizon H and taking the limit H ∞. 
Defining  0 0 0(1 )
IIA gt
t t Pt TtP c Y e        as before, our simple rule for the optimal price of 
carbon becomes (8).  Taking the limit    0, gives (7).  
To obtain the feedback Nash equilibrium without commitment, we have to take into account the 
resetting of carbon prices in each period. In our simple framework, the only time-varying 
determinant of the carbon price is exogenously growing GDP. We can, therefore, simply evaluate 
the carbon price of (8) at time t = 0 and substitute ( )Y t for 0Y  to obtain (8). 
In a more general model, it is much more difficult to calculate the feedback or subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium as one would allow for capital stock dynamics and more general equilibrium 
interactions of the economic and climate system. This is even so for the relatively straight-forward 
case of the special assumption of logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production function, 100% 
depreciation of capital each period, exponential damages to TFP and a linear carbon cycle and 
used by Golosov et al. (2014) and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in discrete time which has 
exponential discounting for all future periods and an additional parameter to bias up the welfare 
weight of the present by more than all future periods (Gerlagh and Liski, 2018). The analysis is 
more complicated with more general functional forms and generalised hyperbolic discounting 
(Iverson and Karp, 2018). 
 
Appendix 3: Further details on the benchmark calibration 
The economic drivers of climate policy consist of initial fossil fuel and renewable energy costs, 
G0, H0, and H1, which are calibrated to give current energy cost shares of 7% of GDP and the 
additional cost of 5.6% of GDP for full decarbonisation following DICE. The rate of directed 
technical change of rate of 1.3% per year is chosen to match the cost of 1.6% of GDP for full 
decarbonisation in 100 years, again based on DICE. The cost of carbon-based energy increases 
by 0.1% per year to capture resource scarcity and match baseline emissions scenarios of the EMF-
22 (Nordhaus, 2015). The cost of full sequestration is calibrated to initial 20% of GDP, falls at 
the rate of non-carbon technologies, and decreases to 5.7% of GDP in 100 years. Given that there 
is large uncertainty around the technological prospects of CCS and other abatement technologies, 
we conduct sensitivity analyses around them in section 7. Initial GDP is 73 T$ and energy use per 
unit of GDP of 0.14 GtC/T$ is calibrated to match current yearly emissions of 10 GtC. We keep 
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emissions intensity itself constant as we capture the adoptions of carbon-free technologies 
endogenously in at and mt. The flow damage of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere of 
0.019 $/tC which equals 0.5% of GDP at current levels of atmospheric carbon.   
The calibration of the climate module to the model of Joos et al. (2013) follows Mattauch et al. 
(2018) except the calibration of the lag structure which deviates from the original model. Here 
we use the finding of Caldeira and Ricke (2014) who find that maximum peak warming occurs in 
the median after 10 years in the model of Joos et al. (2013). Together with the fact current and 
committed warming currently are 1°C and 1.3°C, respectively, we have 
 10 / ln 4.33(1 ) ,Tlag x    with x the percentage of peak warming occurring after 10 years. We 
set x = 99% and Tlag = 3.2 years. 
 
Appendix 4: Pricing carbon under declining absorption rates 
With a time-dependent absorption rate the Hamiltonian with climate feedback for this problem is 
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Again, for purposes of deriving our simple rule for the optimal price of carbon only, we suppose 
that along a steady growth path, c is approximately constant or that IIA = 0. Hence, (A15) gives 
0
1
.
1 /
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tY e dc
r Tlag
  

Equations (A8) and (A9) give  
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1 1
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 with 
 
2 2
0
x
x yx e e dy    the Dawson integral of x. Defining  0 0 0(1 ) ,
IIA gt
t t Pt TtP c Y e        the 
simple rule for the optimal price of carbon with declining absorption can be evaluated 
parametrically. at and mt follow from (A11) and (A12) and are identical to the expressions given 
in (1) and (2).  
 
Appendix 5: Fossil fuel extraction costs that rise as reserves fall, sequestration costs that 
rise and renewable costs that fall as cumulative use rises 
Here we consider the case when fossil fuel extraction get more costly if reserves fall, so costs 
increase with cumulative fossil fuel use: 00
0
( ) 1 ,Fr t tt
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G S G e e
S
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 with e > 0 and S0 and St 
denoting initial fossil fuel reserves at time zero and t, respectively. Fossil fuel reserves decline 
according to the depletion equation (1 )S m Y   with S0 given. Cumulative fossil fuel use is 
S0 – ST. We also let costs for sequestration rise as more carbon is sequestrated and reservoir 
capacity has shrunk for geological or NIMBY reasons, so cost of sequestration can be specified 
as 2
1
1
,aAr t t t
a
A e a V
 

  with β2 > 0, where the stock of sequestrated carbon evolves according to 
(1 ) .V aF a m Y    We let renewable energy production gets cheaper with learning by doing, 
one can specify the cost of mitigation as 3
1
1
m Rr t
t t
m
m H e B
 

  with β3 > 0, where the stock of 
accumulated knowledge about renewable energy production evolves according to .B R m Y   
We then get the following generalised rules for climate policy. 
Result A1: Our simple rule for the optimal carbon price is given by (7) in Result 1. The time 
paths for the optimal sequestration and share of renewables in the energy mix are 
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where ( )t t St Bt t Vt tX a          and ( ),S t  ( )V t and ( )B t are the scarcity value of in-situ 
fossil fuel, the social cost of sequestrating an additional unit of carbon, and the social benefit of 
learning by doing in renewable energy production at time t, respectively. 
Proof: The Hamiltonian function is  
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  The first-order optimality conditions are (A3), (A4), (A5), 
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Defining 0
gt
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(A3), (A4) and (A5). With 0 ,
IIA gt
St t Stc Y e   0
IIA gt
Vt t Vtc Y e    and 0 ,
IIA gt
Bt t Btc Y e   we see that 
equation (A14) yields 
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Equation (A23) can be rewritten as (A17). Similarly, equation (A6) gives  
(A24) 2
1
0 =
aAr t
t t VA e a V
      
which gives (A16). Equations (A20)-(A22) give the dynamics of the scarcity rent on fossil fuel 
(RFF), the social cost of sequestration (SCS) and the social benefit of learning by doing (SBL): 
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This extended back-of-the-envelope IAM needs to solve (A25)-(A27) together (A16)-(A17), the 
depletion equation 
0 0(1 ) ,
r t gtS m e Y e

    the sequestration sink cost equation 
0 0(1 ) ,
r t gtV a m e Y e
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   and the learning-by-doing equation 0 0
r t gtB m e Y e

  as a two-point-
boundary value problem with predetermined values for S(0), V(0) and B(0). 
Without the ability to capture the effects of scarcity to deposit sequestered carbon in and the 
benefits of renewable innovation, there are three market failures now, which need three 
corrections. The first one is to price carbon at the social cost of carbon (SCC), which is the present 
discounted value of all future marginal damages from burning one unit of fossil fuel today. The 
second one is to subsidise renewable energy use at the social benefit of learning by doing in 
renewable energy production (SBL), which from (A27) amounts to the present discounted value 
of all future reductions in the cost of renewable energy production from producing one unit of 
renewable energy today. The third one is a tax on CCS to allow for the increasing costs of 
sequestration as more reservoirs are used up. This tax is set to the social cost of sequestration 
(SCS), which from (A26) equals the present value of all future increases in sequestration costs 
resulting from sequestrating one unit of carbon today. In contrast, the scarcity rent of fossil fuel 
(RFF) is from (A25) the present discounted value of all future increases in extraction costs 
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resulting from depleting one unit of fossil fuel today. The RFF is internalised by fossil producers 
and requires no government action.  
It follows from equation (A17) that a bigger share of renewable energy is used if the scarcity rent 
on fossil fuel, the social benefit of learning in renewable energy production, and, to the extent that 
it is used, the social cost of sequestration is high. In other words, the share of renewables in the 
energy mix increases in RFF+SCC+SBL and, to the extent that sequestration takes place, 
decreases in SCCSCS. As in equation (1) of Result 1, it also increases in the costs of extracting 
fossil fuel and sequestrating carbon emissions. Equation (A16) extends equation (2) and shows 
that the fraction of carbon that is sequestrated increases in the difference between the price of 
carbon and the social cost of sequestration, i.e., it increases in SCCSCS. 
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